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SIGECOM
2011
ACM

Multilateral matching

8 years 2 months ago
Multilateral matching
We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare theorems, and, when agents’ utilities are concave in venture participation, show that competitive equilibria exist, correspond to stable outcomes, and yield core outcomes. Competitive equilibria exist in our setting even when externalities are present. JEL classification: C78; C62; C71; D85; L14; L24
John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers
Added 17 Sep 2011
Updated 17 Sep 2011
Type Journal
Year 2011
Where SIGECOM
Authors John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers
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