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SAGT
2009
Springer

Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games

10 years 2 months ago
Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games
We study the convergence time of Nash dynamics in two classes of congestion games – constant player congestion games and bounded jump congestion games. It was shown by Ackermann and Skopalik [2] that even 3-player congestion games are PLS-complete. We design an FPTAS for congestion games with constant number of players. In particular, for any > 0, we establish a stronger result, namely, any sequence of (1 + )-greedy improvement steps converges to a (1 + )-approximate equilibrium in a number of steps that is polynomial in −1 and the size of the input. As the number of strategies of a player can be exponential in the size of the input, our FPTAS result assumes that a (1 + )-greedy improvement step, if it exists, can be computed in polynomial time. This assumption holds in previously studied models of congestion games, including network congestion games [9] and restricted network congestion games [2]. For bounded jump games, where jumps in the delay functions of resources are bound...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna
Added 27 Jul 2010
Updated 27 Jul 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where SAGT
Authors Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna
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