Sciweavers

Share
SPAA
2006
ACM

Network design with weighted players

9 years 8 months ago
Network design with weighted players
We consider a model of game-theoretic network design initially studied by Anshelevich et al. [2], where selfish players select paths in a network to minimize their cost, which is prescribed by Shapley cost shares. If all players are identical, the cost share incurred by a player for an edge in its path is the fixed cost of the edge divided by the number of players using it. In this special case, Anshelevich et al. [2] proved that pure-strategy Nash equilibria always exist and that the price of stability—the ratio between the cost of the best Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal solution—is Θ(log k), where k is the number of players. Little was known about the existence of equilibria or the price of stability in the general weighted version of the game. Here, each player i has a weight wi ≥ 1, and its cost share of an edge in its path equals wi times the edge cost, divided by the total weight of the players using the edge. This paper presents the first general results on w...
Ho-Lin Chen, Tim Roughgarden
Added 14 Jun 2010
Updated 14 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where SPAA
Authors Ho-Lin Chen, Tim Roughgarden
Comments (0)
books