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ISAAC
2005
Springer

Network Game with Attacker and Protector Entities

10 years 9 months ago
Network Game with Attacker and Protector Entities
Consider an information network with harmful procedures called attackers (e.g., viruses); each attacker uses a probability distribution to choose a node of the network to damage. Opponent to the attackers is the system protector scanning and cleaning from attackers some part of the network (e.g., an edge or a path), which it chooses independently using another probability distribution. Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability of escaping its cleaning by the system protector; towards a conflicting objective, the system protector aims at maximizing the expected number of cleaned attackers. We model this network scenario as a non-cooperative strategic game on graphs. We focus on the special case where the protector chooses a single edge. We are interested in the associated Nash equilibria, where no network entity can unilaterally improve its local objective. We obtain the following results: – No instance of the game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium. – Every mixed Nash equili...
Marios Mavronicolas, Vicky G. Papadopoulou, Anna P
Added 27 Jun 2010
Updated 27 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where ISAAC
Authors Marios Mavronicolas, Vicky G. Papadopoulou, Anna Philippou, Paul G. Spirakis
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