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MKTSCI
2010

Optimal Reverse-Pricing Mechanisms

12 years 11 months ago
Optimal Reverse-Pricing Mechanisms
Reverse pricing is a market mechanism under which a consumer's bid for a product leads to a sale if the bid exceeds a hidden acceptance threshold the seller has set in advance. The seller faces two key decisions in designing such a mechanism: First, he must decide where in the process to collect the revenue--that is, whether to commit to a minimum markup above cost (and thus define the bid-acceptance threshold given cost) and whether to set a fee for the consumer's right to bid. Second, the seller must decide whether to facilitate or hinder consumer learning about the current bid-acceptance threshold. We analyze these decisions for a profit-maximizing small intermediary retailer selling to consumers who can also purchase the product in an outside posted-price market. The optimal revenue model is to charge a fee for the right to bid and then accept all bids above cost, rather than to set a positive minimum markup above cost. Avoiding minimum markups in favor of a bidding fee ...
Martin Spann, Robert Zeithammer, Gerald Häubl
Added 20 May 2011
Updated 20 May 2011
Type Journal
Year 2010
Where MKTSCI
Authors Martin Spann, Robert Zeithammer, Gerald Häubl
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