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2008
IEEE

Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses

8 years 2 months ago
Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses
Abstract--Our study analyzes the security and privacy properties of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD). Introduced to the U.S. market in 2003, this model of ICD includes pacemaker technology and is designed to communicate wirelessly with a nearby external programmer in the 175 kHz frequency range. After partially reverse-engineering the ICD's communications protocol with an oscilloscope and a software radio, we implemented several software radio-based attacks that could compromise patient safety and patient privacy. Motivated by our desire to improve patient safety, and mindful of conventional trade-offs between security and power consumption for resourceconstrained devices, we introduce three new zero-power defenses based on RF power harvesting. Two of these defenses are humancentric, bringing patients into the loop with respect to the security and privacy of their implantable medical devices (IMDs). Our contributions provide a scientific baseline for understanding t...
Daniel Halperin, Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, Benjami
Added 15 Dec 2010
Updated 15 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2008
Where SP
Authors Daniel Halperin, Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, Benjamin Ransford, Shane S. Clark, Benessa Defend, Will Morgan, Kevin Fu, Tadayoshi Kohno, William H. Maisel
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