Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions

We consider the problem of minimizing preference elicitation in efficient multiattribute auctions, that support dynamic negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, time-of-delivery, and processor speed. We introduce asynchronous price-based multiattribute auctions, with proxy bidding agents that sit between the auctioneer and the participants. Empirical results demonstrate the preference elicitation savings that are provided with minimal price spaces, asynchronous updates, and proxy agents. Categories and Subject Descriptors F.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences—Economics. General Terms Algorithms, Economics.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2003
• Where: SIGECOM
• Authors: Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes
• Keywords: Multiattribute Auctions, Preference Elicitation, Preference Elicitation Savings, SIGECOM 2003