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Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes

9 years 6 months ago
Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes
— The Internet’s interdomain routing protocol, BGP, is vulnerable to a number of damaging attacks, which often arise from operator misconfiguration. Proposed solutions with strong guarantees require a public-key infrastructure, accurate routing registries, and changes to BGP. However, BGP routers can avoid selecting and propagating these routes if they are cautious about adopting new reachability information. We describe a protocolpreserving enhancement to BGP, Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP), that slows the dissemination of bogus routes, providing network operators time to respond before problems escalate into largescale Internet attacks. Simulation results show that realistic deployments of PGBGP could provide 99% of Autonomous Systems with 24 hours to investigate and repair bogus routes without affecting prefix reachability. We also show that without PGBGP, 40% of ASs cannot avoid selecting bogus routes; with PGBGP, this number drops to less than 1%. Finally, we show that PGBGP is inc...
Josh Karlin, Stephanie Forrest, Jennifer Rexford
Added 11 Jun 2010
Updated 11 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where ICNP
Authors Josh Karlin, Stephanie Forrest, Jennifer Rexford
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