Sciweavers

Share
TARK
2009
Springer

Program equilibria and discounted computation time

10 years 1 months ago
Program equilibria and discounted computation time
Tennenholtz (GEB 2004) developed Program Equilibrium to model play in a finite twoplayer game where each player can base their strategy on the other player’s strategies. Tennenholtz’s model allowed each player to produce a “loop-free” computer program that had access to the code for both players. He showed a folk theorem where the result of any mixed-strategy individually rational play could be an equilibrium payoff in this model even in a one-shot game. Kalai et al. gave a general folk theorem for correlated play in a more generic commitment model. We develop a new model of program equilibrium using general computational models and discounting the payoffs based on the computation time used. We give an even more general folk theorem giving correlatedstrategy payoffs down to the pure minimax of each player. We also show the existence of equilibrium in other games not covered by the earlier work.
Lance Fortnow
Added 27 May 2010
Updated 27 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where TARK
Authors Lance Fortnow
Comments (0)
books