Sciweavers

Share
CORR
2000
Springer

The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited

9 years 7 months ago
The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited
We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called "cryptographic hash functions". The main result of this paper is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a "good implementation" of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges.
Ran Canetti, Oded Goldreich, Shai Halevi
Added 17 Dec 2010
Updated 17 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2000
Where CORR
Authors Ran Canetti, Oded Goldreich, Shai Halevi
Comments (0)
books