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Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects

10 years 11 months ago
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p) with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, individual rational- ity, and minimizing the budget imbalance. This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. When the objects are identical, this prob- lem has been solved by Moulin [1] and Guo and Conitzer [2]. However, it remains an open problem to design such a rebate function when the ob- jects are heterogeneous. We propose a mechanism, HETERO and conjec- ture that HETERO is individually rational and weakly budget balanced. We provide empirical evidence for our conjecture through experimental simulations.
Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari
Added 05 Jan 2009
Updated 25 Dec 2009
Type Conference
Year 2008
Where Shanghai, China
Authors Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari
In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics(WINE), 2008, pp 438-445.
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