Regular Protocols and Attacks with Regular Knowledge

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Regular Protocols and Attacks with Regular Knowledge
We prove that, if the initial knowledge of the intruder is given by a deterministic bottom-up tree automaton, then the insecurity problem for cryptographic protocols with atomic keys for a bounded number of sessions is NP-complete. We prove also that if regural languages (given by tree automata) are used in protocol descriptions to restrict the form of messages, then the insecurity problem is NexpTime-complete. Furthermore, we define a class of cryptographic protocols, called regular protocols, such that the knowledge which the intruder can gain during an unlimited number of sessions of a protocol is a regular language.
Tomasz Truderung
Added 03 Dec 2009
Updated 03 Dec 2009
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where CADE
Authors Tomasz Truderung
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