A relation-algebraic approach to simple games

Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple games and develop relational algorithms for solving some basic problems of them. In particular, we test certain fundamental properties of simple games (being monotone, proper, respectively strong) and compute specific players (dummies, dictators, vetoers, null players) and coalitions (minimal winning coalitions and vulnerable winning coalitions). We also apply relation-algebra to determine central and dominant players, swingers and power indices (the Banzhaf, Holler-Packel and Deegan-Packel indices). This leads to relation-algebraic specifications, which can be executed with the help of the BDD-based tool RelView after a simple translation into the tool’s programming language. In order to demonstrate the visualization facilities of RelView we consider an example of the Catalonian Parliament after the 2003 ele...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: EOR
• Authors: Rudolf Berghammer, Stefan Bolus, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Harrie C. M. de Swart
• Keywords: Certain Fundamental Properties, Coalitions, EOR 2011, Simple Games