A Representationalist Theory of Intention

Several formalizations of cognitive state that include intentions and beliefs based on normal modal logics (NMLs) have appeared in the recent literature. We argue that NMLs are not an appropriate representation for intention, and provide an alternative model, one that is representationalist, in the sense that its semantic objects provide a more direct representation of cognitive state of the intending agent. We argue that this approach results in a much simpler model of intention than does the use of an NML, and that, moreover, it allows us to capture interesting properties of intention that have not been addressed in previous work

• Type: Conference
• Year: 1993
• Where: IJCAI
• Authors: Kurt Konolige, Martha E. Pollack
• Keywords: Cognitive State, IJCAI 1993, IJCAI 2007, Normal Modal Logics, Several Formalizations