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ATAL
2006
Springer

Resource selection games with unknown number of players

9 years 11 months ago
Resource selection games with unknown number of players
In the context of pre-Bayesian games we analyze resource selection systems with unknown number of players. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric safety-level equilibrium in such games and show that in a linear model every player benefits from the common ignorance about the number of players. In order to analyze such games we generalize the theory of equilibrium in general pre-Bayesian games.
Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
Added 20 Aug 2010
Updated 20 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where ATAL
Authors Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
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