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2000

Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids

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Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids
This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for combinatorial auctions, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., an agent tries to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). If there exists no false-name bid, the generalized Vickrey auction (GVA) satisfies individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and incentive compatibility. On the other hand, when false-name bids are possible, it is theoretically impossible for a combinatorial auction protocol to simultaneously satisfy these three properties. The Leveled Division Set (LDS) protocol, which is a modification of the GVA, utilizes reservation prices of auctioned goods for making decisions on wheth...
Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara
Added 01 Nov 2010
Updated 01 Nov 2010
Type Conference
Year 2000
Where AAAI
Authors Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara
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