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2010
Tsinghua U.

Robust Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players

9 years 2 months ago
Robust Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players
: Maximizing revenue in the presence of perfectly informed players is a well known goal in mechanism design. Yet, all current mechanisms for this goal are vulnerable to equilibrium selection, collusion, privacy and complexity problems, and therefore far from guaranteeing that maximum revenue will be obtained. In this paper we both clarify and rectify this situation by
Jing Chen, Avinatan Hassidim, Silvio Micali
Added 09 Aug 2010
Updated 09 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2010
Where ICS
Authors Jing Chen, Avinatan Hassidim, Silvio Micali
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