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10

ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.

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Robust Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players

13 years 8 months ago

Robust Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players

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: Maximizing revenue in the presence of perfectly informed players is a well known goal in mechanism design. Yet, all current mechanisms for this goal are vulnerable to equilibrium selection, collusion, privacy and complexity problems, and therefore far from guaranteeing that maximum revenue will be obtained. In this paper we both clarify and rectify this situation by

Jing Chen, Avinatan Hassidim, Silvio Micali

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Distributed And Parallel Computing | Equilibrium Selection | ICS 2010 | Maximum Possible Revenue | Maximum Revenue |

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Added	09 Aug 2010
Updated	09 Aug 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2010
Where	ICS
Authors	Jing Chen, Avinatan Hassidim, Silvio Micali

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