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ATAL
2008
Springer

Searching for approximate equilibria in empirical games

8 years 4 months ago
Searching for approximate equilibria in empirical games
When exploring a game over a large strategy space, it may not be feasible or cost-effective to evaluate the payoff of every relevant strategy profile. For example, determining a profile payoff for a procedurally defined game may require Monte Carlo simulation or other costly computation. Analyzing such games poses a search problem, with the goal of identifying equilibrium profiles by evaluating payoffs of candidate solutions and potential deviations from those candidates. We propose two algorithms, applicable to distinct models of the search process. In the revealed-payoff model, each search step determines the exact payoff for a designated purestrategy profile. In the noisy-payoff model, a step draws a stochastic sample corresponding to such a payoff. We compare our algorithms to previous proposals from the literature for these two models, and demonstrate performance advantages. Categories and Subject Descriptors I.2.8 [Problem Solving, Control Methods, and Search]: Heuristic methods...
Patrick R. Jordan, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P
Added 12 Oct 2010
Updated 12 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2008
Where ATAL
Authors Patrick R. Jordan, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman
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