Security of Blind Signatures under Aborts

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Security of Blind Signatures under Aborts
We explore the security of blind signatures under aborts where the user or the signer may stop the interactive signature issue protocol prematurely. Several works on blind signatures discuss security only in regard of completed executions and usually do not impose strong security requirements in case of aborts. One of the exceptions is the paper of Camenisch, Neven and shelat (Eurocrypt 2007) where the notion of selective-failure blindness has been introduced. Roughly speaking, selective-failure blindness says that blindness should also hold in case the signer is able to learn that some executions have aborted. Here we augment the work of Camenisch et al. by showing how to turn every secure blind signature scheme into a selective-failure blind signature scheme. Our transformation only requires an additional computation of a commitment and therefore adds only a negligible overhead. We also study the case of multiple executions and notions of selective-failure blindness in this setting. ...
Dominique Schröder, Marc Fischlin
Added 25 Nov 2009
Updated 25 Nov 2009
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where PKC
Authors Dominique Schröder, Marc Fischlin
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