Security Games with Incomplete Information

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Security Games with Incomplete Information
—We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games where at each stage of the iterations the players make imperfect observations of each other’s previous actions. The players are the Attacker and the Defense System, who have at their disposal two possible actions each. For the former, the two actions are “attack” and “not to attack”, and for the latter they are “defend” and “not to defend”. The underlying decision process can be viewed as a fictitious play (FP) game, but what differentiates this class from the standard one is that the communication channels that carry action information from one player to the other, or the sensor systems, are error prone. Two possible scenarios are addressed in the paper: (i) the error probabilities associated with the sensor systems are known to the players, then our analysis provides guidelines for each player to reach the Nash equilibrium (NE), which is related to the NE of the under...
Kien C. Nguyen, Tansu Alpcan, Tamer Basar
Added 21 May 2010
Updated 21 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where ICC
Authors Kien C. Nguyen, Tansu Alpcan, Tamer Basar
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