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CANS
2015
Springer

Security of Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes Against Mass Surveillance

5 years 7 months ago
Security of Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes Against Mass Surveillance
Abstract Following the line of work presented recently by Bellare, Paterson and Rogaway, we formalize and investigate the resistance of linear secret-sharing schemes to mass surveillance. This primitive is widely used to design IT systems in the modern computer world, and often it is implemented by a proprietary code that the provider (“big brother”) could manipulate to covertly violate the privacy of the users (by implementing Algorithm-Substitution Attacks or ASAs). First, we formalize the security notion that expresses the goal of big brother and prove that for any linear secret-sharing scheme there exists an undetectable subversion of it that efficiently allows surveillance. Second, we formalize the security notion that assures that a sharing scheme is secure against ASAs and construct the first sharing scheme that meets this notion.
Irene Giacomelli, Ruxandra F. Olimid, Samuel Ranel
Added 17 Apr 2016
Updated 17 Apr 2016
Type Journal
Year 2015
Where CANS
Authors Irene Giacomelli, Ruxandra F. Olimid, Samuel Ranellucci
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