Self-Referencing Languages Revisited

Paradoxes, particularly Tarski's liar paradox, represent an ongoing challenge that have long attracted special interest. There have been numerous attempts to give either a formal or a more realistic resolution to this area based on natural logical intuition or common sense. The present semantic analysis of the problem components concludes that the traditional language of logic fails to detect Tarski's paradox, since the formalised version of the liar sentence does not represent a correct definition. Neither the formal language, nor the logical system is deficient in this respect. Only natural language statements cannot be interpreted adequately by traditional language of logic.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: WSPI
• Authors: Gábor Rédey, Attila Neumann
• Keywords: Natural Logical Intuition, Tarski's Liar Paradox, Traditional Language, WSPI 2004, WSPI 2008