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Sequential Bandwidth and Power Auctions for Distributed Spectrum Sharing

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Sequential Bandwidth and Power Auctions for Distributed Spectrum Sharing
We study a sequential auction for sharing a wireless resource (bandwidth or power) among competing transmitters. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource via a sequential second-price auction. It is well known that a second price auction for a single indivisible good has an efficient dominant strategy equilibrium; this is no longer the case when multiple units of a homogeneous good are sold in repeated iterations. For two users with full information, we show that such an auction has a unique equilibrium allocation. The worst-case efficiency of this allocation is characterized under the following cases: (i) both bidders have a concave valuation for the spectrum resource, and (ii) one bidder has a concave valuation and the other bidder has a convex valuation (e.g., for the other user's power). Although the worst-case efficiency loss can be significant, numerical results are presented, whic...
Junjik Bae, Eyal Beigman, Randall A. Berry, Michae
Added 13 Dec 2010
Updated 13 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2008
Where JSAC
Authors Junjik Bae, Eyal Beigman, Randall A. Berry, Michael L. Honig, Rakesh V. Vohra
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