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TARK
2007
Springer

Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes

12 years 6 months ago
Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
Multiple election paradoxes arise when voting separately on each issue from a set of related issues results in an obviously undesirable outcome. Several authors have argued that a sufficient condition for avoiding multiple election paradoxes is the assumption that voters have separable preferences. We show that this extremely demanding restriction can be relaxed into the much more reasonable one: there exists a linear order x1 > ... > xp on the set of issues such that
Lirong Xia, Jérôme Lang, Mingsheng Yi
Added 09 Jun 2010
Updated 09 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2007
Where TARK
Authors Lirong Xia, Jérôme Lang, Mingsheng Ying
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