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VOTEID
2007
Springer

Simulation-Based Analysis of E2E Voting Systems

9 years 9 months ago
Simulation-Based Analysis of E2E Voting Systems
Abstract. End-to-end auditable voting systems are expected to guarantee very interesting, and often sophisticated security properties, including correctness, privacy, fairness, receipt-freeness, . . . However, for many well-known protocols, these properties have never been analyzed in a systematic way. In this paper, we investigate the use of techniques from the simulation-based security tradition for the analysis of these protocols, through a case-study on the ThreeBallot protocol. Our analysis shows that the ThreeBallot protocol fails to emulate some natural voting functionality, reflecting the lack of election fairness guarantee from this protocol. Guided by the reasons that make our security proof fail, we propose a simple variant of the ThreeBallot protocol and show that this variant emulates our functionality.
Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, Jean-Jacques
Added 09 Jun 2010
Updated 09 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2007
Where VOTEID
Authors Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira, Jean-Jacques Quisquater
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