A Statistical Attack on RC6

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This paper details the attack on RC6 which was announced in a report published in the proceedings of the second AES candidate conference (March 1999). Based on an observation on the RC6 statistics, we show how to distinguish RC6 from a random permutation and to recover the secret extended key for a fair number of rounds.

Henri Gilbert, Helena Handschuh, Antoine Joux, Ser

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Cryptology | Fair Number | FSE 2000 | Random Permutation | Secret Extended Key |

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Added	24 Aug 2010
Updated	24 Aug 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2000
Where	FSE
Authors	Henri Gilbert, Helena Handschuh, Antoine Joux, Serge Vaudenay

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A Statistical Attack on RC6

Cryptology | Fair Number | FSE 2000 | Random Permutation | Secret Extended Key |

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