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CORR
2010
Springer

Stochastic Games for Security in Networks with Interdependent Nodes

8 years 7 months ago
Stochastic Games for Security in Networks with Interdependent Nodes
This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose security assets and vulnerabilities are correlated. Such a network can be modeled using weighted directed graphs with the edges representing the influence among the nodes. The game can be formulated as a non-cooperative zero-sum or nonzerosum stochastic game. However, due to correlation among the nodes, if some nodes are compromised, the effective security assets and vulnerabilities of the remaining ones will not stay the same in general, which leads to complex system dynamics. We examine existence, uniqueness, and structure of the solution and also provide numerical examples to illustrate our model.
Kien C. Nguyen, Tansu Alpcan, Tamer Basar
Added 09 Dec 2010
Updated 09 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2010
Where CORR
Authors Kien C. Nguyen, Tansu Alpcan, Tamer Basar
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