Sciweavers

Share
PKC
2012
Springer

Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange from Factoring, Codes, and Lattices

9 years 10 months ago
Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange from Factoring, Codes, and Lattices
Abstract. An unresolved problem in research on authenticated key exchange (AKE) is to construct a secure protocol against advanced attacks such as key compromise impersonation and maximal exposure attacks without relying on random oracles. HMQV, a state of the art AKE protocol, achieves both efficiency and the strong security model proposed by Krawczyk (we call it the CK+ model), which includes resistance to advanced attacks. However, the security proof is given under the random oracle model. We propose a generic construction of AKE from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). The construction is based on a chosen-ciphertext secure KEM, and the resultant AKE protocol is CK+ secure in the standard model. The protocol gives the first CK+ secure AKE protocols based on the hardness of integer factorization problem, code-based problems, or learning problems with errors. In addition, instantiations under the Diffie-Hellman assumption or its variant can be proved to have strong security without...
Atsushi Fujioka, Koutarou Suzuki, Keita Xagawa, Ka
Added 29 Sep 2012
Updated 29 Sep 2012
Type Journal
Year 2012
Where PKC
Authors Atsushi Fujioka, Koutarou Suzuki, Keita Xagawa, Kazuki Yoneyama
Comments (0)
books