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CORR
2012
Springer

The Structure of Signals: Causal Interdependence Models for Games of Incomplete Information

8 years 5 months ago
The Structure of Signals: Causal Interdependence Models for Games of Incomplete Information
Traditional economic models typically treat private information, or signals, as generated from some underlying state. Recent work has explicated alternative models, where signals correspond to interpretations of available information. We show that the difference between these formulations can be sharply cast in terms of causal dependence structure, and employ graphical models to illustrate the distinguishing characteristics. The graphical representation supports inferences about signal patterns in the interpreted framework, and suggests how results based on the generated model can be extended to more general situations. Specific insights about bidding games in classical auction mechanisms derive from qualitative graphical models.
Michael P. Wellman, Lu Hong, Scott E. Page
Added 20 Apr 2012
Updated 20 Apr 2012
Type Journal
Year 2012
Where CORR
Authors Michael P. Wellman, Lu Hong, Scott E. Page
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