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PODC
2011
ACM

Sustaining collaboration in multicast despite rational collusion

8 years 5 months ago
Sustaining collaboration in multicast despite rational collusion
This paper focuses on designing incentive mechanisms for overlay multicast systems. Existing proposals on the problem are no longer able to provide proper incentives when rational users collude or launch sybil attacks. To overcome this key limitation, we propose a novel decentralized DCast multicast protocol and prove that it offers a novel concept of safety-net guarantee: A user running the protocol will always obtain at least a reasonably good utility despite the deviation of any number of rational users that potentially collude or launch sybil attacks. Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.4 [ComputerCommunication Networks]: Distributed Systems – distributed applications General Terms: Algorithms, Design, Security
Haifeng Yu, Phillip B. Gibbons, Chenwei Shi
Added 17 Sep 2011
Updated 17 Sep 2011
Type Journal
Year 2011
Where PODC
Authors Haifeng Yu, Phillip B. Gibbons, Chenwei Shi
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