Synthesizing Secure Protocols

Abstract. We propose a general transformation that maps a cryptographic protocol that is secure in an extremely weak sense (essentially in a model where no adversary is present) into a protocol that is secure against a fully active adversary which interacts with an unbounded number of protocol sessions, and has absolute control over the network. The transformation works for arbitrary protocols with any number of participants, written with usual cryptographic primitives. Our transformation provably preserves a large class of security properties that contains secrecy and authenticity. An important byproduct contribution of this paper is a modular protocol development paradigm where designers focus their effort on an extremely simple execution setting – security in more complex settings being ensured by our generic transformation. Conceptually, the transformation is very simple, and has a clean, well motivated design. Each message is tied to the session for which it is intended via dig...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: ESORICS
• Authors: Véronique Cortier, Bogdan Warinschi, Eugen Zalinescu
• Keywords: Cryptographic Protocol, ESORICS 2007, General Transformation, Security Privacy, Usual Cryptographic Primitives