Time and the Prisoner's Dilemma

B This paper examinesthe integration of computational complexity into gametheoretic models. Theexample focused on is the Prisoner’s Dilemma,repeated for a finite length of time. Weshowthat a minimalbound on the players’ computationalability is sufficient to enable cooperative behavior. Ill addition, a variant of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmagameis suggested, in whichplayers havethe choice of opting out. This modification enriches the gameand suggests dominanceof cooperative strategies. Competitiveanalysis is suggestedas a tool for investigating sub-optimal (but computationallytractable) strategies and gametheoretic modelsin general. Using competitiveanalysis, it is shownthat for bounded players, a sub-optimal strategy might be the optimal choice, givenresourcelimitations.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2007
• Where: CORR
• Authors: Yishay Mor, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
• Keywords: Computational Complexity, CORR 2007, Education, Finite Length, Paper Examinesthe Integration