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SIGECOM
2010
ACM

The unavailable candidate model: a decision-theoretic view of social choice

10 years 2 months ago
The unavailable candidate model: a decision-theoretic view of social choice
One of the fundamental problems in the theory of social choice is aggregating the rankings of a set of agents (or voters) into a consensus ranking. Rank aggregation has found application in a variety of computational contexts. However, the goal of constructing a consensus ranking rather than, say, a single outcome (or winner) is often left unjustified, calling into question the suitability of classical rank aggregation methods. We introduce a novel model which offers a decision-theoretic motivation for constructing a consensus ranking. Our unavailable candidate model assumes that a consensus choice must be made, but that candidates may become unavailable after voters express their preferences. Roughly speaking, a consensus ranking serves as a compact, easily communicable representation of a decision policy that can be used to make choices in the face of uncertain candidate availability. We use this model to define a principled aggregation method that minimizes expected voter dissati...
Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier
Added 18 Jul 2010
Updated 18 Jul 2010
Type Conference
Year 2010
Where SIGECOM
Authors Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier
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