Uncertainty in Interdependent Security Games

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Uncertainty in Interdependent Security Games
Abstract. Even the most well-motivated models of information security have application limitations due to the inherent uncertainties involving risk. This paper exemplifies a formal mechanism for resolving this kind of uncertainty in interdependent security (IDS) scenarios. We focus on a single IDS model involving a computer network, and adapt the model to capture a notion that players have only a very rough idea of security threats and underlying structural ramifications. We formally resolve uncertainty by means of a probability distribution on risk parameters that is common knowledge to all players. To illustrate how this approach might yield fruitful applications, we postulate a well-motivated distribution, compute Bayesian Nash equilibria and tipping conditions for the derived model, and compare these with the analogous conditions for the original IDS model.
Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags, Nicolas Christi
Added 11 Feb 2011
Updated 11 Feb 2011
Type Journal
Year 2010
Authors Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags, Nicolas Christin, John Chuang
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