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AAMAS
2011
Springer
10 years 6 months ago
Alternatives to truthfulness are hard to recognize
Abstract. The central question in mechanism design is how to implement a given social choice function. One of the most studied concepts is that of truthful implementations in which...
Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, ...
AAMAS
2011
Springer
10 years 6 months ago
Multi-agent role allocation: issues, approaches, and multiple perspectives
In cooperative multi-agent systems, roles are used as a design concept when creating large systems, they are known to facilitate specialization of agents, and they can help to redu...
Adam Campbell, Annie S. Wu
AAMAS
2011
Springer
10 years 6 months ago
Using focal point learning to improve human-machine tacit coordination
We consider an automated agent that needs to coordinate with a human partner when communication between them is not possible or is undesirable (tacit coordination games). Speciļ¬...
Inon Zuckerman, Sarit Kraus, Jeffrey S. Rosenschei...
AAMAS
2011
Springer
10 years 6 months ago
Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness
We study the case where agents have preferences over ranges (intervals) of values, and we wish to elicit and aggregate these preferences. For example, consider a set of climatologi...
Joseph Farfel, Vincent Conitzer
Intelligent Agents
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