Belief revision performs belief change on an agent's beliefs when new evidence (either of the form of a propositional formula or of the form of a total pre-order on a set of ...
Intelligent agents require methods to revise their epistemic state as they acquire new information. Jeffrey’s rule, which extends conditioning to uncertain inputs, is used to re...
Salem Benferhat, Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, Mary-...
Intelligent agents require methods to revise their epistemic state as they acquire new information. Jeffrey’s rule, which extends conditioning to probabilistic inputs, is appropr...
Salem Benferhat, Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, Mary-...
We look at the problem in belief revision of trying to make inferences about what an agent believed--or will believe--at a given moment, based on an observation of how the agent h...
Abstract. We propose a very general syntactical notion of epistemic state and a compact axiomatization for iterated revision when the new information is an epistemic state. We set ...