In this paper we define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In our sequents we distinguish between the current knowledge of prin...
Notions of program dependency arise in many settings: security, partial evaluation, program slicing, and call-tracking. We argue that there is a central notion of dependency commo...
Abstract. Using a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus designed for specifying security properties as observational equivalences, we develop a form of bisimulation that j...
Ajith Ramanathan, John C. Mitchell, Andre Scedrov,...
This paper presents the first automatic technique for proving not only protocols but also primitives in the exact security computational model. Automatic proofs of cryptographic pr...
We describe CoSP, a general framework for conducting computational soundness proofs of symbolic models and for embedding these proofs into formal calculi. CoSP considers arbitrary...