This paper analyzes sequential auctions for private value objects using second-price sealed-bid rules. Now, the equilibrium bids for such auctions depend on the information uncerta...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
We consider models for bargaining in social networks, in which players are represented by vertices and edges represent bilateral opportunities for deals between pairs of players. ...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna
The field of multiagent decision making is extending its tools from classical game theory by embracing reinforcement learning, statistical analysis, and opponent modeling. For ex...
Michael Wunder, Michael Kaisers, John Robert Yaros...
We present an experimental investigation of the performance of the Lemke-Howson algorithm, which is the most widely used algorithm for the computation of a Nash equilibrium for bi...
We study an economic setting in which a principal motivates a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort toward the success of a joint project. The action taken by each agent...