Abstract. The abstraction of cryptographic operations by term algebras, called DolevYao models or symbolic cryptography, is essential in almost all tool-supported methods for provi...
We prove the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol secure under real, active cryptographic attacks including concurrent protocol runs. This proof is based on an abstract crypt...
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of security protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the co...
We describe a faithful embedding of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. This model is cryptographically sound in ...
Christoph Sprenger, Michael Backes, David A. Basin...
Abstract. We present a general method to prove security properties of cryptographic protocols against active adversaries, when the messages exchanged by the honest parties are arbi...