Proxy bidding has been proposed for combinatorial auctions as a means to speed up the auctions, to simplify the user interface, and to limit strategic behavior. The only previousl...
Combinatorial auctions are difficult to analyze in part because of the vast number of potential strategies available to the bidders. Proxy bidding interfaces limit the users’ s...
Peter R. Wurman, Gangshu Cai, Jie Zhong, Ashish Su...
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
We present a cryptographic protocol for conducting efficient, provably correct and secrecy-preserving combinatorial clock-proxy auctions. The “clock phase” functions as a trust...
David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Christopher Tho...
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...