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WECWIS
2005
IEEE
153views ECommerce» more  WECWIS 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
A Framework for Computing the Outcome of Proxied Combinatorial Auctions
Proxy bidding has been proposed for combinatorial auctions as a means to speed up the auctions, to simplify the user interface, and to limit strategic behavior. The only previousl...
Jie Zhong, Peter R. Wurman
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
160views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
An algorithm for computing the outcome of combinatorial auctions with proxy bidding
Combinatorial auctions are difficult to analyze in part because of the vast number of potential strategies available to the bidders. Proxy bidding interfaces limit the users’ s...
Peter R. Wurman, Gangshu Cai, Jie Zhong, Ashish Su...
AAAI
2000
13 years 6 months ago
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
FC
2009
Springer
118views Cryptology» more  FC 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy Auctions
We present a cryptographic protocol for conducting efficient, provably correct and secrecy-preserving combinatorial clock-proxy auctions. The “clock phase” functions as a trust...
David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Christopher Tho...
AMAI
2005
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...
David C. Parkes