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ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
Alexander Kress, Craig Boutilier
CORR
2002
Springer
105views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 3 months ago
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm