Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysi...
Suzana Andova, Cas J. F. Cremers, Kristian Gj&osla...
Verifying security properties of protocols requires developers to manually create protocol-specific intruder models, which could be tedious and error prone. We present Slede, a ve...
Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a framework composed of a syntax and its compositional Petri net semantics, for the specification and verification of properties (like authent...
Roland Bouroulet, Raymond R. Devillers, Hanna Klau...
We present a formalism for the automatic verification of security protocols based on multi-agent systems semantics. We give the syntax and semantics of a temporal-epistemic securit...
The application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researched during the last 25 years. Several formalisms and (semi-)automatic tools for the ver...