We put forward a new approach to mechanism design, and exemplify it via a new mechanism guaranteeing significant revenue in unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Our mechanism ? su...
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of speciļ¬c information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
In this article a new algorithm for grid resource allocation based upon the theory of Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD) is presented. This algorithm is targeted at minimizing cost...
Most research on auctions assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for the item being auctioned, and that they use this information s...
Auction mechanism design has traditionally been a largely analytic process, relying on assumptions such as fully rational bidders. In practice, however, bidders often exhibit unkn...
David Pardoe, Peter Stone, Maytal Saar-Tsechansky,...