We show that the Vickrey auction, despite its theoretical benefits, is inappropriate if “antisocial” agents participate in the auction process. More specifically, an antisoc...
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation, task assignment and last but not leas...
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where...
Enrico Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yuen,...
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation and task assignment. In many cases the...
This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Com...