7 search results - page 1 / 2 » A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently man... |
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
TARK
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
A classical result in voting theory, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, states that for any non-dictatorial voting rule for choosing between three or more candidates, there will b...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based onl...
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents' ...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...