abstraction of imperfect information games ANDREW GILPIN and TUOMAS SANDHOLM Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA, USA Finding an equilibrium of an...
Abstract: This paper defines the extensive form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correla...
Abstract. We consider finding maximin strategies and equilibria of explicitly given extensive form games with imperfect information but with no moves of chance. We show that a max...
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, T...
Finding an equilibrium of an extensive form game of imperfect information is a fundamental problem in computational game theory, but current techniques do not scale to large games...
Abstract. In this paper we present a new symbolic algorithm for the classification, i. e. the calculation of the rewards for both players in case of optimal play, of two-player gam...