17 search results - page 1 / 4 » Algorithm Design for Agents which Participate in Multiple Si... |
AMEC
2000
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2000
Springer
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2006
Springer
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2006
Springer
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying/selling multiple objects. These two mechanisms yield different outcomes (i.e., different revenues and a...
FOCS
2007
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2007
IEEE
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2005
ACM
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...