We develop an algorithm for opponent modeling in large extensive-form games of imperfect information. It works by observing the opponent’s action frequencies and building an opp...
Abstract. Years of work have gone into algorithms and optimizations for twoplayer perfect-information games such as Chess and Checkers. It is only more recently that serious resear...
We show how to find a normal form proper equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-player zero-sum extensive form game with imperfect information but perfect recall. Our a...
We present a computational approach to the saddle-point formulation for the Nash equilibria of two-person, zero-sum sequential games of imperfect information. The algorithm is a ï¬...
Perfect recall is the common and natural assumption that an agent never forgets. As a consequence, the agent can always condition its choice of action on any prior observations. I...
Kevin Waugh, Martin Zinkevich, Michael Johanson, M...