Abstract. The central question in mechanism design is how to implement a given social choice function. One of the most studied concepts is that of truthful implementations in which...
Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, ...
We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social unction f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanis...
— The Web has become the most popular place for people to acquire information. Unfortunately, it is widely recognized that the Web contains a significant amount of untruthful inf...
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been shown that dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is important to ...