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AAAI
2000
13 years 6 months ago
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar
ESA
2009
Springer
156views Algorithms» more  ESA 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
On Revenue Maximization in Second-Price Ad Auctions
Abstract. Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first...
Yossi Azar, Benjamin E. Birnbaum, Anna R. Karlin, ...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
139views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. ...
Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
CORR
2010
Springer
188views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 4 months ago
Agent Based Trust Management Model Based on Weight Value Model for Online Auctions
This paper is aimed at the stipulations which arise in the traditional online auctions as a result of various anomalies in the reputation and trust calculation mechanism. We try t...
E. Sathiyamoorthy, N. Ch. Sriman Narayana Iyengar,...